Early Confucianism as a Model for Crafting Character

Abstract

Some people in the humanities, philosophers among them, have argued that there is no such thing as human nature. This can helpfully be understood as a kind of secular liberal expression of exceptionalism: instead of claiming that we alone are made in God's image, these modern secular humanists insist that, unlike every other animal on earth, we create ourselves out of whole cloth, are untethered to any environment or ecology, and do not carry the history of our long and convoluted evolution within us. I don’t believe there is anyone qualified to pronounce a definitive opinion on the first issue, but the latter is in deep tension with a great deal of the best science of our day. It also rejects views that continue to be widely embraced in cultures around the world and that have been held for a long time, despite extensive scrutiny and criticism. Many early Greek and Roman philosophers and early Chinese philosophers agree that there is such a thing as human nature—though they held a range of different beliefs about what it is like—and that the good life for creatures like us has to be understood in terms of the possibilities and limitations our nature and ecology pose for us. These two grand traditions also agree that our first nature, whatever we are deep down under the cover and embellishment of culture, needs to be developed or reworked into a second nature in order to realize the good life; they both espouse philosophies of self-cultivation. I am not suggesting, nor will I be arguing, that they have solved the problems of morality, but I will be defending the claim that they offer a most appealing basic approach and scheme for exploring such problems, the approach and scheme roughly being: how do we understand first nature and how can we shape or transform first nature into a second nature that enables the best kind of lives for creatures like us (where best is described as the overall most satisfying, meaningful, and flourishing life we can lead)? I will focus primarily on the early Chinese tradition and contemporary work in empirical and evolutionary psychology and cognitive neuroscience to present my case, and I will relate my discussion to the role that rituals, as well as laws and institutions, can play in order to make a first run at sketching several of the basic themes explored in other essays in this volume. © 2024 Taylor & Francis.