Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities
- Authors
- Casajus, André; Funaki, Yukihiko; Huettner, Frank
- Issue Date
- Sep-2024
- Publisher
- Academic Press Inc.
- Keywords
- Chinese restaurant process; Ewens distribution; Expected accumulated worth; Externalities; Null player; Partition function form; Potential; Random partition; Restriction operator; Shapley value
- Citation
- Games and Economic Behavior, v.147, pp 88 - 106
- Pages
- 19
- Indexed
- SSCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Volume
- 147
- Start Page
- 88
- End Page
- 106
- URI
- https://scholarx.skku.edu/handle/2021.sw.skku/115846
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.004
- ISSN
- 0899-8256
1090-2473
- Abstract
- The Shapley value equals a player's contribution to the potential of a game. The potential is a most natural one-number summary of a game, which can be computed as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition of the players. This computation integrates the coalition formation of all players and readily extends to games with externalities. We investigate those potential functions for games with externalities that can be computed this way. It turns out that the potential that corresponds to the MPW solution introduced by Macho-Stadler et al. (2007, J. Econ. Theory 135, 339–356) is unique in the following sense. It is obtained as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition, it generalizes the potential for games without externalities, and it induces a solution that satisfies the null player property even in the presence of externalities. © 2024 Elsevier Inc.
- Files in This Item
- There are no files associated with this item.
- Appears in
Collections - Graduate School of Business Administration > ETC > 1. Journal Articles

Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.