ScholarWorks@성균관대학교

초록

First, we study a quantity-setting [price-setting] duopoly with managerial delegation, in which only one firm's delegation contract is disclosed to the public before the managers choose their firms' output levels [prices]. In each duopoly model, we consider two cases, Cases I and II, which are distinguished by the timing of the owners' moves, and we compare their outcomes. Results demonstrate that in both duopoly models, the outcomes in Case I are the same as those in Case II. Second, we study two general games with imperfect and asymmetric information, which are applicable to the managerial delegation duopolies described above. In both games, each party has two sequential moves; only one party discloses its chosen first action to the public before the parties simultaneously choose their second actions. The two games differ in the timing of the parties' first moves. We develop solution techniques for these games.

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