Fine’s Semantic Relationism: The Problem of Individuating Meaning
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초록

In this paper, I aim to argue that Fine’s semantic relationism faces several issues. To this end, I classify Fine’s view into two phases: the initial and the later. The distinction, on my interpretation, concerns the question of where coordination relations obtain. I then argue that both the initial and later views encounter difficulties in adequately individuating the meanings of expressions. More specifically, I argue that the initial view struggles to individuate the contents involving three distinct co-referential terms, as the contents it assigns are too coarse. By contrast, the later view and its variant struggle to individuate the contents involving demonstratives, as the contents they assign in this case are too fine-grained. Based on these considerations, I conclude that neither view succeeds in properly individuating meaning, and I articulate the dilemma that Fine’s theory faces.

키워드

CoordinationDe jure coreferenceFrege’s puzzleKit fineSemantic relationismCOORDINATIONCOREFERENCEBELIEF
제목
Fine’s Semantic Relationism: The Problem of Individuating Meaning
저자
Park, Seong Soo
DOI
10.1007/s11406-025-00903-z
발행일
2025-10
유형
Article
저널명
Philosophia
53
3
페이지
1247 ~ 1264