ScholarWorks@성균관대학교

초록

Bernard Williams famously raises the ‘one thought too many’ objection against impartialist moral theories, especially Kantian ethics. He considers a case in which a man must choose whom to save between two individuals in equal peril—his wife and a stranger. According to Williams, the man should save his wife without a second thought; if he pauses to consider whether saving her rather than the stranger is morally justified, he is guilty of having had “one thought too many.” This paper develops a new Kantian response to the objection. The central claim is that the man is not morally responsible for the stranger’s death because, although his wife and the stranger are equivalent in all other morally relevant respects, he bears an additional special duty to his wife as her spouse. Consequently, he may justify his choice by appealing to the principle that when two options are alike in all morally relevant respects except that failing to choose one option would additionally involve the agent’s violation of a special duty, it is permissible to prioritize that option. On this basis, he can argue that his decision does not violate the Kantian requirement of impartiality. Moreover, he may contend that no morally better alternative was available. Thus, his decision can be defended from an impartial moral standpoint without denying the moral significance of his personal ties.

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